Maximum Security

Constructing Threat

The societies of 'Old Europe' are in a phase of transition, which means, for broad sections of the population, everyday circumstances are more precarious. The consequent feelings of insecurity and their political and medial transformation pervade the very depths of their domestic environment. Michael Zinganel and Fritz Sack discuss how far 'solutions', like the way of life in 'gated communities', or the application of private security technology, contribute to a situation, whereby the requirements and the wishes of large parts of society can no longer be articulated publicly but are instead relegated to their private sphere.

Zinganel: What are the bases of the relatively young scientific discipline of criminal sociology? What was the purpose for its establishment? Where does the cognitive interest of the criminal sociologist lie, and who are his addressees? What exactly interests you most in this area of research? In your opinion, what is the most important socio-political task of criminal sociology?

Sack: The narrations depicting the origins of sociology I like the most, are the ones linking its birth with the upheavals of the French Revolution. The man who gave sociology its name, the philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857), saw himself as the founder of Scientific Positivism, which was supposed to lead humanity, after a theological and metaphysical stage, into its third and final stage. His, and sociology's, motto was, "Savoir pour prévoir – prévoir pour prévenir" (Knowledge with a view to anticipation, anticipation with a view to prevention).

Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) exercised and demonstrated Comte's philosophical principles inherent in the discipline. Criminality was for Durkheim one of the most basic, and at the same time one of the most informative, introductions to society in its present condition. He maintained that, just as illness constitutes a normal part of a person's existence, criminality is part of the normality of societal existence, and it must serve social integration and social change (he said: "Nothing unites a society more than its murderers"). To want to eliminate crime would therefore be as Utopian as it would be 'terrorist'.

From the anthropologist and forensic medical scientist Alexandre Lacassagne (1844–1921), a contemporary of Durkheim, we derive a pronouncement he used as a counterweight to the impact of the idea of the 'born criminal' (exonerating society somewhat), maintained by the Italian psychiatrist, Cesare Lombroso (1836–1909) who said, "Every society has the criminals which it deserves."[1] This, if one likes, is the mantra – and the cognitive interest – germane to criminal sociology.

What has interested me most deeply for some time is, in the terms of a modified book title of Michel Foucault's[2], the 'rebirth' of the prison or the establishment of a 'Gulag – western style'[3], a 'punitive turn' observed for a good many years in all 'advanced' countries, whereby the USA is the pacemaker of this development. I also tie this in with the most important socio-political task of criminal sociology, which is to show that this self-destructive development is only superficially linked with the development of criminality, but that it needs a struggle against criminality as a projective crystallisation point uniting processes foreign to crime itself. 'Criminality', and the struggle against it, serve to numb woes and pains from elsewhere; this is something which will soon be apparent.

Zinganel: Security seems to be the 'in' subject today, in any case. Everyone talks about security or cases of security – they long for it, they miss it, they promise security or offer security or guarantees of security, don't they? Security is a veritable market place. At the same time, security is an extremely nebulous and diffuse concept. What system of categorisation can sociology offer us, in order to help us to come to terms with the dangerous jungle milling with all kinds of security? Which aspects of security can be related to domestic and urban environments?

Sack: You said it: security, or to put it more clearly, the struggle for security, has become the number one topic in our modern society. A most visible, and at the same time most helpless, expression of this all important process is the so called 'punitive turn', whereby security is won punitively, in that criminal law gets used as a sort of multi-purpose weapon in the fight against conditions of precariousness in our society. Criminality and inner security are possibly the most intensively used and pursued areas of policy in recent years – and not just since 'Nine-Eleven, 2001', the terrorist attack on the citadels of the one remaining 'empire', the United States.

You're perfectly correct in referring to the vagueness and the diffuse character of the idea of security, but that's what makes it so useful: it's ideal for recording and processing a host of really different requirements and matters. The Anglo-Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has questioned this most exhaustively and sensitively. Basically, he assumes that whilst various currents flow into the stream of insecurity, there is only one drainage canal leading from this current. To elucidate this conceptual model he utilised a semantic differentiation in English which does not exist in German.[4] Whilst German people speak about 'security' or 'insecurity' in a general or comprehensive sense, the English language has three separate concepts for the same set of circumstances: 'security' in the sense of social security and social safeguarding; 'certainty' when referring to security in the sense of reliability and sureness; and finally 'safety', the word impinging most closely of all on the fields of criminality and inner security. Two kinds of conclusions come to mind: on the one hand, the widely circulating insecurity in modern 'flexible' societies feeds partly, nay par excellence, on increasing social insecurity ('Hartz IV'[5]) not forgetting the vanishing reliability and availability of earning capacities enabling us to support ourselves and our dependants, coinciding with easier ways of dismissing people, etc. On the other hand, the state's own freedom to manoeuvre and mould circumstances in the political areas of social security and employment is falling, even though the state has not relinquished its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. When it comes to meting out punishment, the state can carry on regardless, although often in vain – that is to say, symbolically, just 'showing the flag'.

The 'production' of security in our society shows another, mainly hidden, paradoxical, not to say perverse, quality: the cry for security which drowns every other sound prevents us from seeing clearly that there are important protagonists in our society who base and justify their existence by means of this very insecurity. Simplifying things for purposes of easy memorisation, we could call them the four 'P-people', namely police, politicians, publicists and private security services. Every one of these people makes his special contribution to the material in hand, which has been analysed, epitomised as 'Making Crime Pay'.[6]

As far as politics and its profit at the polls is concerned, an American sociologist has analysed and described this by using the expressive term of 'Governing through Crime'.[7] In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany one should call to mind the Provincial Election in the Hanseatic City in 2001. The PRO, Partei Rechts-staatlicher Offensive (in plain language: the Schill-Party, after the name of its founder), a party founded just a year earlier, which fed on the fear of a break-down in law and order, managed to get 19,4% of all the votes, just like that.

When considering this development in relation to the living room and urban areas of society, we can orient our initial position by studying the success of the Schill-Party in Hamburg. The party, you see, did especially well in areas where people are socially and economically deprived – that is to say, in areas where both the above mentioned 'non-criminal sources' of insecurity are most palpable. In this way, we may add that the socio-ecological dimension of crime and criminal control acquire a new quality and degree of deterioration. In this respect we need not just see the city as 'potential booty'[8] in the context of economic utilisation processes; but we are also impelled to consider legally-based regulations aimed at achieving homogeneous, consumption-friendly, hygienic and video-monitored environments.

Zinganel: Does this mean that, considered socio-economically, those social groups most in danger of becoming indigent are the ones calling most vociferously for a strengthening of the (state's) monopoly of force? Don't people say, at the same time, that the danger of violence is at its greatest in the socially endangered communities themselves? What do these groups believe the danger scenario really entails? Whom should the state, in their opinion, actually punish? And for what reason? Does

the way people vote really tally with certain scientific investigations, relating to their nightmares, for example?

Sack: It isn't automatically inconsistent to cry out for a strong state and at the same time to be potentially violent oneself. Both things can occur together. Irrespective of this, our experience in recent years has shown that socio-economic decline and unemployment tend rather, in practice, to lead to a kind of paralysis, isolation and passiveness, and in no way whatever, evoke the mental potential which could give rise to recalcitrance, rebellion and physical belligerence. There is absolutely no reason to think that experiences of impoverishment and social exclusion could be politically combined to bring about that once famous figure – despite all (present) anxiety – of the public, political, but basically civilian social character (the collective actor and, in my opinion, one of a right-wing Nazi caliber). For some years the state, the politicians and the media have been conjuring up visions of the danger of civil commotions and even serious uprisings, in an historical reminiscence of the start and also of the heyday of the 19th and of the first half of the 20th century.

This reflection brings me on to one of a greater scope, namely that one's talk about 'potential violence' in fact comes more from historical memories than from any current 'potential for violence'. Increasingly I have the impression that the very expectation of violence is itself an entity, and ergo plays a role, which implies both a certain threatening potential and a chance for instilling more discipline.

At the end of the '80s the Conservative government under Kohl launched a so called 'Independent Commission on Violence'[9], with great acclaim as well as sumptuous financial and symbolic means, towards the goal of ascertaining and combating this violence. In this process the commission invented the phantom of crime 'felt', after the traditional instruments for recording and scanning criminal reality had shown no likelihood of yielding to politicians' expectations of finding a disconcerting increase in a propensity toward crimes of violence, this being the 'raison d'être' of their existence and assignment. Since this time, by the way, a realisation has been confirmed in politically motivated discussions – even amongst scientific experts – that fear of a crime-wave is, to use the language of the stock exchange, a volatile phenomenon, which, in its severance and autonomy from genuine crime, is exposed to pressures, moods and forms of manipulation that lend themselves very easily to the kind of opportunistic utilisation already indicated.

Zinganel: In other cultures, like the American one, the contrary impression is gained, when one lends credence to Neil Smith or Mike Davis, namely, that the well-off people were the ones, who in a fit of panic, had evacuated the dangerous inner cities. Is that the case, or have the poorer classes in the United States simply no spokesperson to voice their fears? According to this, the better-off would tend to fence themselves in within their suburbs, in enclosed settlement areas, which take their brief from presumably clean-cut pre-modern city forms. These settlement areas are a booming market. In this respect, it appears as if the community of interest – constituted by the same spare-time interests, the same income level, etc. – might well replace traditional community forms.

In this connection, blasé young suburban adults would only be prepared to return to the inner city after it had been substantially cleansed of dangerous elements, and after they had been assured of their secure communities of interest. Is this tendency to withdraw from a kind of urbanism marked by differences also to be perceived in our case?

Sack: Societies in the form of a high-security wing have, as we know, been on their way for a long time. M. Davis' prophetic and poignant Excavating the Future in Los Angeles in his book City of Quartz[10], corroborates this most forcefully: not only in gated communities but also in limited-access occupational, leisure-time, shopping and commuter areas – and not only in 'Fortress America'. The USA is not even the most advanced society in this respect. I have seen this myself fifteen years ago in Columbia and other South American countries, and recently in South Africa, in such a virulent form that a European would be impelled to make a comparison, not with the circumstances he's experiencing himself, but rather with chronicled and dimly remembered features of the Middle Ages – isolated patches of fortified, enclosed, integrated and secure living areas, in-between, unsafe areas and connecting routes for contact and transport. A sharp-eyed observer cannot fail to notice that this process is also taking place in our European societies.

Once again we must refer to the key words 'economisation' or 'commercialisation' when trying to discern the dynamic factors in this development. Direction, via the market rather than through the

state, now necessitates the transformation of 'requirements' into effective 'demand'. This only becomes feasible through the input of available means and resources. As collective resources are transformed into private property, so health, security, water and other vital essentials end up as scarce commodities. Competition must occur within the needy community for access and enjoyment of these commodities. Of course, one can literally calculate who is going to be at a disadvantage, fall by the wayside and be excluded. The 'community of interest' is revealed not so much as a cultural product and construct – as at one time during the holy epoch of the class struggle but rather, a temporary, recidivously 'volatile' phenomenon, the binding material and sinews of which are as 'transient' and lively as its lubricant, capital itself.

Zinganel: I think it is important to a add a fifth 'P' to the first four; namely: 'P' for planners!

Techniques in security, in architecture and city planning, have served – since time immemorial – not just to protect us from external attack, but to constantly control and discipline those people who have resided in the protective inner circle of dwellings or cities. The planners experience, owing to the high investment costs entailed by their planned edifices, abject dependency on the mighty and wealthy (of the realm), whose mania for control and order they genuinely share by virtue of their habitual outlook. For this reason they realise either the aspirations of just the wealthy or, instead, (after receiving an assignment from the municipality or the building contractors), they build for the lower middle-class, the class to which inspectors belong.

In many cases they participate actively in the composition of threatening scenarios, slandering certain forms of urban disorder, and then achieving 'tabula rasa' with the help of a massive building project. As this costs a comparatively large sum of money, the threatening scenario must be correspondingly massive and, likewise, the circuitous profitability or the direct profit that can be liquidated after this investment is significant. How is this anxiety, apropos urban areas, actually produced and what are the results when it comes to building measures?

Sack: You've caught me on the wrong footing with this question, at least partly, so I will tread carefully. You, unless I am mistaken, have cast your gaze – unlike many in your guild and profession – on participation among, and occasionally as well, on complicity with architects, apropos the erection and reinforcement of physical, ergo social, internal and external boundaries. This (ominous) involvement is occasionally rebutted by your functionaries, as I ascertained recently with my own ears during a Hamburg conference on 'the public construction of residential premises' in different European societies. Conversely, and this is where I am prepared to tread more confidently, in the sense of criminological and criminal political perspectives, there have been enquiries and impertinent demands made to the planners (thank you for adding to my 'P-people'), long before the latest 'maximum-security-discourses', by small and larger environments.

To put it more exactly: there were questions, which were in fact insinuations, based on intimations. The American-Canadian theoretician on architecture, Jane Jacobs[11] is in favour – as shown in her numerous books appearing since the '60s – of sensitising the link between space and sociality, including vis à vis the security debate. Her American colleague in the field of architecture, Oscar Newman, is the spiritual and entrepreneurial father of the international 'movement' called CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design[12]). The effective influence of CPTED has steadily risen since the publication of Newman's book, Defensible Space[13]; this has become a key work for architects and security-minded people. Jacobs may well experience her own heyday in the wake of the so called 'preventive turn', for example, in the development of technical means for enhancing entrance-security in thresholds and house entran-ces of all kinds. In France the name plates on house doors were replaced by a numerical code during the unrest around '68. Similarly, the massive rebuilding in Paris carried out in the second half of the 19th century by the architect Haussmann above all served to keep revolutionary disturbances better under control, so people once said, thanks to wide and straight boulevards, etc.

The inspecting agents of the criminal scene were always attentive listeners. Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (the BKA) had even organised and documented a presentation on urban development and crime some years ago.[14]

Zinganel: On their own initiative, since the beginning of this year, the Federal Police Office have started to offer planners, and further-training centres working for the Architects' Chambers throughout

Germany, a kind of file they've made with details of planning aids and various courses on crime prevention in specific situations.

Security aspects were doubtless the main criteria beforehand – and increasing the respective turnovers of the enterprises concerned. This was, and is, not just the case in respect of single buildings, areas of settlement or cities; but it is also the case for our society as a whole, which, in the meantime, is being characterised by the 'hegemony of the large concerns'. This development did not come out of thin air; and, what's more, it meets with surprisingly little resistance. Can the roots in this process be made out, can this process be recounted in a structured way?

Sack: Both things apply and I see it like you: this development has not come about just like that, and the resistance to it is not very impressive – even though attac and some other NGO's have some mobilisation potential at their disposal. The economic keywords that apply to the re-narration of this development have already been used and may be specified. Our society's current state of mind is intimately linked with two political icons of the last decades: Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher – both, as we know, pioneers of neo-liberalism, the primacy of economics over politics. The link this policy has forged between the worlds of economics and security was luridly put in a nutshell when the former speaker of the American House of Representatives Newt Gingrich said, "Taxes down and death penalty up!". On the subject of social responsibility Thatcher once answered a question in a women's magazine with the celebrated and notorious phrase, "There is no such thing as society…". A scientific observer summarised his analysis of the first Thatcher-period with the title, The Free Economy and the Strong State.[15]

The direction the re-narration should take is already given – an important chapter in it must deal with that group of Chicago-based economists and social scientists close to the legendary Milton Friedman and his economic imperialism. Then, of course, the keywords 'the post modern era' would merit substantial coverage and consideration – thanks to which, you could, as we know, re-enter your very familiar and well-known terrain of architecture.

Zinganel: The architectural post modern era satisfies, first and foremost, the demand for an emotionalised language of form, which, in the semiotic sense of the word, offers its habitants and users a symbol, providing identity ergo orientation and 'security'. What is interesting, is the fact that individual artifacts or the new settlement constructions associated with New Urbanism are increasingly adorned with a number of real and symbolic preventive measures, so that simple operations involving opening and closing become ostentatious. Without a doubt there seems to be a wide market for this. Security has become a status factor.

If everything is organised on the lines of marketing economics, what concrete form will measures designed to achieve a 'more economic security policy' take? You have already brought up the issue of appropriate legal regulations, with a view to generating homogeneous, consumer-friendly, 'sanitary' and video-monitored environments. Have there been investigations into their acceptability and effectiveness? What happens to subjects who get checked-out, expelled or are deemed persona non grata? Who decides who carries out the controls as to who gets expelled or considered persona non grata and, according to what criteria?

Sack: A more 'economic' security policy – economic, that is to say, from the point of view of the state and its budget – makes use, amongst other things, of 'deregulation', a term germane to economic policy. The term is known to us only too well in connection with the 'outsourcing' of prisons and of private security services, but it is also known through the so-called strategy of 'responsiblising' members of society. Security demands, to use that pleasant expression, a sort of 'joint effort': a community product deriving from state and society, namely *PPPs* (Public Private Partnerships) of the most varied sort; neighbourhood watches, of the Anglo-Saxon type, or 'community prevention councils' i.e. 'kommunale Präventionsräte' of the German sort; quite apart from private measures and efforts. As regards the acceptability of this development, state and politics, as in the past, perceive the requirement, conditioned by the fact that protection and security are perennially the most noble and indispensable of public and state duties.

And how effective are these strategies? People mutter under their breath about the biggest secret of public effectiveness, which lies in the ineffectiveness of police-based criminal security, seen, at any rate, according to the criteria of society's expectations. An answer to the question about what we should do with certain 'controlled subjects' might seem too terse and culturally inappropriate in the

form in which it once appeared on the cover page of *Time Magazine*, "Lock' em up and throw the key". In our case, one is tampering with (the concept of) preventive detention. People are talking about scrapping detention in a reform school (for juveniles), whose very claim on 'resocialisation' is being openly questioned. Who decides about (someone's) exclusion? His or her previous guards and inspectors – and this is decided according to criteria which verbally and rhetorically are identical with previous versions but, as we know, the 'law in the books' and the 'law in action' are often at variance.

Zinganel: In the context of architecture and city planning, an additional aspect apropos security, amongst others, comes into play: the economic performance of the investment. It's not enough just to protect real estate from unwanted trespassers, one must preserve, or even better increase, the value of the real estate until it can be resold. This is the case par excellence when commercial applications are involved (office towers, shopping malls, urban entertainment centres) and increasingly, in the case of private homes. In this respect, persons owning their own home share the profit orientation involved in an abstract real estate fund, where the shareholders do not even know any more, what belongs to them, nor what they possess in their portfolio, provided the performance remains satisfactory.

Here we see how radical the dominance of economic criteria has become. Do you see ramifications for the townscape and for residential areas?

Sack: Although it's very true that an all pervasive economic orientation in respect of home ownership applies, just as in the case of a real estate fund, there are still differences in degree as regards the relationship and the 'bond' between the person and the object: for a person with an interest in a fund, no form of identity-forming consciousness can develop, in the sense of owning one's 'home and hearth', which is definitely the case for the home owner. He or she will however also be 'dispossessed' of his or her own home, should strangers or exogenous factors in the neighbourhood lead to a loss in property values. There are well-known examples of local citizens' resistance against the accommodation of asylum seekers in the neighbourhood or the erection of a 'junkies' centre'.

The regime of the market is the driving force in the field of land utilisation, it is the 'invisible hand' in the case of urban reorganisation, in the instance of celebrated 'gentrification', and in the context of urban transformation. This pro-cess is at the same time cause and effect, since it accelerates the relocation of the residential population within the city; in the sense of an appreciation of values and reconstruction, and equally through decline and de(con)struction.

Zinganel: In the (bourgeois) cultural history of the city we can determine two constant factors apropos the production of anxiety, which have remained tenacious: the bourgeois (middle-class) areas have been described since time immemorial as being safe, the districts dominated by the proletariat or by immigrants being considered instead, to be unsafe. In point of fact, the former were illuminated at night comparatively early on, the others, however, remained in the dark for a long time. It was said that the inner area was safe; that it had to be protected from external dangers! By way of contrast, public areas, especially external areas at night, were perilous.

This is how a kind of mental mapping grew up, whereby certain areas were stigmatised as being 'no-go' areas and others were mysticised as being idyllic. Can these constructed differences be verified by any statistics? If not, how can these views be justified?

Sack: When you ask questions like this you stray in fact into the realms of virtual reality, fantasy and myths against which everyday reality often makes a sorry figure – in accordance with the 'Thomas Theorem', "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences".

Myth number one: The security prevailing in the bourgeois district and the lack of safety in working class and immigrant areas. The sociologist Popitz sharply attacked this notion by criticising the verisimilitude of the official list of transgressions provided by the criminal statistics, and in referring to the 'corruptibility' of the estimated number of unreported cases – maybe through the possession of a private villa impeding the law's direct gaze into private spheres.[16] Apart from this, one knows, since the 'discovery' of 'private' and inner family violence, that the largest risk of violence is in intimate and proximate social areas. Further, in the case of order for the one, and disorder for the other; is there here a clearer sign of the truth that 'prevailing' thoughts and opinions are in fact the 'thoughts of the people in control'? Whose law, what order?[17], the question put in the title of a book appearing in 1976, is as topical today as then, even when one would not today investigate with the help of catchwords like 'class rights' or 'legal system with class bias'. Today we talk about alternative

'cultures' or 'life-styles', and, less frequently about 'subculture'; but we know – notwithstanding – that some have to be wary of the reality of the 'predominant culture' and its wake.

Myth number two: The danger always comes from outside. This is the belief we just discussed, generalised and raised to the next highest level. Especially in the case of organised crime (OC), one caters for one's own salubrious area by constantly referring to the 'connections' abroad – the mafia, the gangs from behind the old iron curtain, from East Asia and so forth – when this is being discussed. Even bulletins about the socalled 'OC-situation', provided by Germany's Fe-deral Criminal Police Office (the BKA), could teach one a thing or two if people would only read them …

The 'mind mapping' practice, that very personal and never published universal street-map belonging first and foremost to the urban epoch is, of course, no new invention, but, at the most, the discovery of a constantly utilised, very personal guide which helped one find his or her way through their environment. The city dweller, as well, stays dependent on the 'automatic', habitual routines and automatisms of everyday life (and survival). However I must add that, should this 'mental map' be characterised, putting it in criminal sociological jargon, by risks of 'victimisation', the 'hot spots' of crime, and certain 'broken windows', this will unleash, under certain circumstances, a fatal spiral of evacuation and reappropriation of public premises. People will shun these places and pathways until they have been sequestrated and turned into 'no-go areas'. Architects and city planners and, of course, the watchers and keepers of public opinion, above all those people possessing the key medial function of gate-keeper – get challenged by those 'varied reports', of the 'faits divers' in the local section of our morning newspapers.

Zinganel: Urban sociology in the tradition of Robert Ezra Park, and the cultural history of the city in the tradition of Walter Benjamin, were both strongly influenced by an assimilation of Sigmund Freud's material, and would, in this context, bring the concept of repression into play. What use, if any, can criminal sociology make of the term 'repression'? Does it recognise 'psychoanalytical' or only 'real' repression? How does this function, and what are the consequences?

Sack: Park, more than Benjamin, has made his mark on the history and systematics of criminal sociology. As we know, Park was a precursor in (the application of) ecology and urban research in sociology. Regarding sociology itself, he is remembered, above all, as the 'head' of the Chicago school during the '20s and '30s. He has recently been the subject of new interest, being employed analytically to facilitate acquaintance with various areas of society and their hidden social 'generative grammar'. An especially methodological attribute, which aided German criminology in particular, can be credited to him thanks to his journalistic past among the 'muckrakers' – a genre of 'investigative' journalism; taking a primary interest in society's nether regions and backstage areas, dragging them into the limelight. Park stands like no other for the self-will and the (other) order germane to 'low-culture' and its habitat.

Can 'repression' be said to play a role, not just in the physical spatial sphere, but also in the sense of the surface when discoursing about crime and punishment? I have previously quoted Bauman's thoughts on the varied origins of insecurity and fear and their own 'repressive' and restrictive convergence regarding the problem of 'inner security' – which constitutes, without a doubt, a massive form of collective repression! There is simply not enough space to do more than perfunctory justice to the plethora and variety of psycho-analytical reflections and conceptions pervading criminal sociological thought since, and thanks to, Freud. The times in which we live have no interest in heeding the rightful lessons psycho-analysis provides, which have already informed our society of its 'punitive injustice' – so voracious is society's lust for punishment, and too indispensable are the scapegoats it needs because of its failures. And what is the result of these acts of repression? Namely, pathological and pitiless self-righteousness at an individual level, and militarisation, isolationism and defensiveness at a collective level.

Zinganel: The 'home' is probably the nucleus of the individual level. It manifests itself as a complex stratum of real and symbolic control authorities, which – as cultural history has taught us – structurise the transition from the 'public' to the 'private' sphere: the (external) wall; the vegetation forming an enclosure; the garden hedge; perhaps the landing or the door with a peep-hole; the vestibule, which had to be brought in front, so that no one could penetrate the sanctuary of one's so called 'private area'!

Sack: 'The sanctity of the private sphere'? Does something of this nature really and truly exist anymore – in view of: the mania for control fostered by anxiety; all the optical and acoustical technology for pervading and overcoming each and every material boundary; collective, masochistic forms of extraversion; minor and major cases of wire-tapping; the apparently inescapable control exercised by video-monitored areas and pathways…? In view of the virtually frivolous opinion of the majority – which borders on being suicidal – that this could only involve evil persons or evil itself: that too, is an insane act of repression!

Translation: Anthony Davis

1 "Les sociétés ont les criminels, qu'elles méritent". Lacassagne coined this term on the first international congress of criminal anthropo-logy in Rome, 1885. The actual quote can be found in: Actes du premier congrès international d'anthropologie criminelle, Rom 1885, p. 167.

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4 Zygmunt Bauman, Die Krise der Politik. Fluch und Chance einer neuen Öffentlichkeit. Hamburg 2000, p. 13f., 30ff.

5 The recently introduced, controversial changes to the German national social security and welfare system.

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11 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, New York 1961.

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14 Edwin Kube (Ed.), Städtebau und Kriminalität. Internationales Symposium im Bundeskriminalamt, Wiesbaden 1979.

15 Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State. The Politics of Thatcherism. 2nd ed., Basingstoke and New York 1994.

16 Heinrich Popitz, Über die Präventivwirkung des Nichtwissens (1968). With an introduction by F. Sack and H. Treiber, Berlin 2003, p. 20.

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